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E

ver since Descartes began his search for certainty in philosophy, many of
the great philosophers have taken up this quest. One solution, proposed
by WVO Quine in his 1969 essay, Naturalized Epistemology, claims
that we must refrain from studying epistemology in philosophy. Quine
claims that our study of knowledge must only occur in the ﬁeld of psychology
and that we should refrain from talking about these issues in philosophy. As
one can imagine, Quine’s essay was met with much criticism and anger among
philosophers. Most notably, Hilary Putnam provides a devastating critique of
naturalized epistemology in his essay, Why Reason Can’t be Naturalized. In this
paper, I present both men’s views, and argue that Putnam’s response, while not
perfect, does demolish the bases for Quine’s arguments about knowledge.
Naturalized epistemology has spawned one of the great debates among
philosophers for almost half a century. Should we eliminate epistemology
as a ﬁeld of philosophy and, instead, look at it from the view of psychology?
This problem stems from an even greater problem, the problem of skepticism,
the rational doubt of what we can know and how much we can know it.
Only recently has the debate encountered this new version: naturalized
epistemology. In this paper, I explain naturalized epistemology and the
problems that arise from it.
Throughout the history of epistemology, philosophers have debated about the
ways to go about deﬁning what knowledge is. Many, like Descartes, believed
that knowledge consisted mainly in some form of justiﬁcatory belief. This
idea later received the acronym, JTB, justiﬁed true belief. It was this tendency
to search for justiﬁcation, which the philosopher, W. V. Quine, spoke out
against in his landmark essay, Epistemology Naturalized.
Quine decided that we needed to move epistemology away from its more
“normative” aspects, and instead center it in the ﬁeld of psychology. He
believed that epistemology, as previously understood, could never lead us
to the answer of the question epistemologists asked, “What is knowledge?”
So, Quine took the route that he claims Hume suggested, that we link
epistemology with a form of psychology, since science is veriﬁable by nature,
while philosophy is not.

164 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010

BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

Now, as a brief explanation, the “normative” refers to the standard
way of looking at epistemology. These normative claims rely on
their stability as a basis for knowledge. What Quine proposes is
that epistemology needs to be moved away from any accepted
foundation. What this will effectively accomplish is to turn
epistemology into an ambiguous science.

the appeal of science lies in the fact that it is intelligible, which
epistemology had not been, Quine believed, until he linked
epistemology with psychology. Another reason is that Quine
believed, as Hume had, that if we brought ﬁelds of philosophy
into ﬁelds of science, we would be able to come to know what,
in this case, knowledge actually is.

As one can expect, Quine’s notion of epistemology being
naturalized and transformed into just another science, was met
with much resistance. Many philosophers, most notably Hilary
Putnam, argued that we should not undertake Quine’s challenge,
since he abandoned philosophy and the nature of justiﬁcation.
Putnam argued that Quine’s puzzling resistance to Cartesian
justiﬁcation, echoing Hume’s skepticism of knowledge, would
lead to a complete elimination of epistemology as it had been
understood for centuries.

Quine began his explanations of naturalized epistemology by
pointing out all the problems with epistemology. By moving
systematically through each of the options philosophers
have offered to account for an understanding of knowledge,
Quine believes that he has disproven them. By focusing on
mathematics as an example, Quine points out how many
people have trusted that they are on the right path, since math,
is intelligible; however, Quine’s conclusion is that even though
math has aspects that may be “philosophically fascinating, … it
does not do what the epistemologist would like of it; it does not
reveal the ground of mathematical knowledge, it does not show
how mathematical certainty is possible” (Quine, 529). This
shows that he believed that the quest for a ﬁrm foundation in
math failed as well. It proved that there are limitations to what
we can do and how we can use, formal logical proofs in relation
to math, and conversely, the world around us.

The debate between supporters of naturalism in epistemology
and naturalism’s opponents has raged ever since Quine
published his essay. Jaegwon Kim, in his recent essay, What
is Naturalized Epistemology?, continues the opposition to
Quine’s view. Kim speciﬁcally attacks Quine’s assertions about
justiﬁcation. Quine, for Kim, by losing justiﬁcation, has taken
all knowledge out of the ﬁeld of epistemology, which defeats
its original purpose. What follows in the wake of removing
justiﬁcation, for Quine, is a reliance on the connection between
evidence and theory. However, Kim claims that evidence and
justiﬁcation are, in fact, one and the same. So, you cannot have
one without the other.
Inherently, this debate is about justiﬁcation and its meaning.
If we are to abandon justiﬁcation because it is difﬁcult to
deﬁne, then, as Quine has done, we must ﬁnd a new means of
looking at knowledge. However, if, as Putnam and Kim argue,
we believe that it may be difﬁcult to deﬁne justiﬁcation, but
the search for its true deﬁnition has not ended, then we must
retain epistemology as a ﬁeld of philosophy and not allow it to
become another ﬁeld of science.
W. V. Quine set off a ﬁrestorm when he published his essay,
Epistemology Naturalized. He believed that he had found
the solution to all the problems epistemologists had faced
for centuries. He argued that epistemology must no longer
be concerned with the justiﬁcation of knowledge, since that
had proved too difﬁcult, and must instead become part of
psychology.
Quine argued this point for a number of reasons. First, he
believed that “epistemology is concerned with the foundations
of science” (Quine, 528), so it seemed only natural to Quine that
epistemology should be linked with a ﬁeld of science. Secondly,
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Quine holds Rudolf Carnap’s work of proving a “rational
reconstruction” in the utmost contempt. He does not believe
that there is any worth in “this creative reconstruction, this
make-believe” (Quine 530), since these concepts do not
prove anything relating to knowledge itself. These “creative
reconstructions,” according to Quine, will only lead to
imperfect translations, which will not bring us any closer to
knowledge. For Quine, these imperfect translations would
be far worse than placing epistemology under the auspices of
psychology.
What Quine claims led him to developing this new relationship
for epistemology was the realization that “a statement about
the world does not always or usually have a separate fund of
empirical consequences that it can call its own” (Quine 533).
So, he is suggesting that we no longer look for justiﬁcation, and
that we should only search for explanations for the origin of
the event. In laying out his new program, Quine concedes that
“philosophers have rightly despaired of translating everything
into observational and mathematical terms…But [Quine]
think[s] that at this point it may be more useful to say rather
that epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and
a clariﬁed status” (Quine 533). He is here claiming that the
only way we can use epistemology is to use it as a psychologist
would.
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Part of Quine’s reasoning for the marriage of epistemology
and psychology is that “we can now make use of empirical
psychology” (Quine 533). He claims that this is the best
alternative, since he is “after an understanding of science as an
institution or process in the world” (Quine 534), and with this
new program we can make induction clearer than before. So,
in effect, Quine has given us a new form of science. This new
form is one in which ordinary, normative claims are thrown out
and all we are left with is an ambiguous approach to scientiﬁc
problems.
Towards the end of the essay, however, Quine returns to discuss
“observation sentences,” which he claims are sometimes able
to assist in epistemology in its original form and the new
naturalized form. The importance of these “observation
sentences” rests on the fact that they point toward a physical
object. It may seem somewhat strange that he raises this point
late in his paper, but as we shall see later described by Hilary
Putnam, these sentences are just one of the many important
features of Quine’s thought.
Many philosophers vociferously disagreed with Quine’s
viewpoints about epistemology and, even with his arguments
against other philosophical endeavors. So, in the next section,
we will examine Hilary Putnam’s arguments against naturalism
in epistemology.
With the ﬁrestorm raging around W. V. Quine’s Epistemology
Naturalized, one of the more articulate philosophers of the
anti-naturalism crowd, Hilary Putnam, wrote his critique of
Quine entitled, Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized. In the essay,
Putnam took on each of Quine’s arguments, point by point, to
make the best case possible against naturalized epistemology. In
presenting his arguments, Putnam takes on his opponents in a
slightly more indirect manner than Quine did.
Putnam points out that “those who raise the slogan
‘epistemology naturalized’…generally disparage the traditional
enterprises of epistemology… [So] in this respect, moreover,
they do not differ from philosophers of a less reductionist kind”
(Putnam 314). What Putnam is doing is allowing the readers
the opportunity to judge for themselves the difference, if any,
between the proponents of naturalized epistemology, and those
they condemn. By setting these comparisons, Putnam believes
that we will we come to the truth of whether a naturalized
epistemology can work.
The ﬁrst possible form of a naturalized epistemology Putnam
observes is evolutionary epistemology. This, he claims, cannot
work in the end, since the “approach assumes, at bottom, a
metaphysically ‘realist’ notion of truth: truth as ‘correspondence
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to the facts’ or something of that kind” (Putnam 314). The
notion expressed does not work because, Putnam claims, we do
not have the ability to judge the truth of any statements dealing
with anything we do not take part in constructing, and if this
is not bad enough, trying to come up with an idea of capacities
would be even worse, for Putnam.
Putnam next goes after the Reliability Theory of Rationality
and cultural relativism. When dispatching of the concept
of a reliability theory, Putnam uses the same argument he
used against evolutionary epistemology, namely that “it too
presupposes a metaphysical notion of truth” (Putnam 316).
In discussing cultural relativism, however, Putnam employs
a more nuanced method of enquiry. Now, at ﬁrst glance, it
would seem that Putnam, with his view that
“Truth claims” are relative to the language in which they are
uttered, would be in favor of a culturally relativistic approach
to epistemology. He is not favoring this approach since he
explains that his conception of truth as relative to language
“does not mean that a claim is right whenever those who
employ the language in question would accept it as right in its
context” (Putnam 316). Putnam argues that there must be a
balancing of two points. First, that “talk of what is ‘right’ and
‘wrong’ in any area only makes sense against the background of
an inherited tradition” and, second, that “traditions themselves
can be criticized” (Putnam 316). Therefore, what he is here
claiming is that no matter what kind of moral standards a
particular culture may hold, rationality is not determined by
those standards; it is beyond human constructions. Cultural
relativism is dangerous for Putnam because it does not rely on
reason. A cultural imperialism follows directly from cultural
relativism, in that it also does not rely on reason, and it relies
solely on one’s culture.
After touching upon all these points, Putnam ﬁnally directly
attacks Quine’s arguments. Putnam claims that he only begins
discussing Quine after explaining away all these previous
ideas “because Quine’s views are much more subtle and much
more elaborate than the disastrously simple views we have
just reviewed, and it seemed desirable to get the simpler views
out of the way ﬁrst” (Putnam 320). He decides that it is best
to discuss what he sees as the dichotomy of two dominant
“strains” in Quine’s thought separately: the positivistic strain
and the ‘epistemology naturalized’ strain.
In Quine’s positivistic writings, Putnam points out his
attachment to “observation sentences,” those sentences that,
for Quine, deﬁne what is real in the world. Putnam ﬁnds
this attachment strange, as “Quine’s ideal systems of the
world are ﬁnitely axiomatizable theories, and contain standard
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

mathematics” (Putnam 321). In this system everything could
be justiﬁed, which, obviously, cannot be done in the real world,
but Putnam believes that it cannot be done in an ideal material
world, either. Since, for Quine, the structure of reality matters,
Putnam posits that Quine’s views are extremely inconsistent,
and this is the biggest problem with positivism in general.
Now, the reason why this problem arises is that both Quine
and Putnam are trying to ﬁnd a foundation for epistemology.
Quine seems to have abandoned the original foundation,
whereas Putnam wants to keep it. Putnam then moves on to
naturalized epistemology itself.
Putnam observes that in Quine’s essay, he has abandoned the
search for justiﬁcation through observation sentences, and,
instead, has decided that epistemology cannot be understood
merely as a ﬁeld of philosophy; it must now become part of
psychology, and thus, a science. The major claim, which
Putnam makes, is that “Quine’s position is sheer epistemological
eliminationism” (Putnam 322), since Quine removes any
forms of justiﬁcation from epistemology, which, for Putnam,
is removing the whole purpose of the ﬁeld from itself. Now,
Putnam admits that Quine has publicly declared that he
never meant to “rule out the normative” in his naturalized
epistemology; Putnam asserts that the reason this claim makes
sense is because Quine viewed the normative as “the search
for methods that yield verdicts that one oneself would accept”
(Putnam 322). If this is true, then Quine cannot be blamed
for ruling out the normative. However, as we will see, this
sentiment is either not true or only partially true.
Putnam explains that we cannot rule out the normative
because “if one abandons the notions of justiﬁcation, rational
acceptability, warranted assertability, and the like, completely,
then ‘true’ goes as well, except as a mere device for ‘semantic
assent’” (Putnam 322). What he is warning us is that if we
follow Quine’s logic of naturalized epistemology; we can do
away with any idea of what can be true. For Putnam, there is
more work to be done, and none of it can be done if we do
not have a notion of ‘true’, and this is where the danger of
naturalism lies.
The problem of normativity was one that both Quine and
Putnam dealt with in their essays, and in later works. Putnam
even concedes, in Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized, that
Quine believed that he was not eliminating the normative in
naturalized epistemology. Despite this acceptance of Quine’s
personal belief, Putnam still had grave doubts about where
naturalized epistemology would lead us, and of Quine’s,
apparently, mistaken belief that he could retain the normative
as part of naturalized epistemology. Clearly, even today, the
contention remains that Quine did in fact eliminate the
normative by naturalizing epistemology.
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Naturalized epistemology leads to a loss of the normative since
it is based on assumptions that allow for the thinker to shift
the foundations he or she is basing his or her ideas upon in
epistemology. This occurs since, as Putnam points out, “if one
abandons the notions of justiﬁcation, rational acceptability…,
and the like, completely, then ‘true’ goes as well” (Putnam
322). His assertion is true, but it is important to note his
emphasis on the word, completely. This danger occurs when
we “completely” throw out the normative. Putnam clearly
believes that Naturalized Epistemology rules out the normative,
but at the same time, he is far more concerned with where the
ideas of Naturalized Epistemology will lead others, rather than
what Quine lays out exactly in his essay. Quine’s claim that he
was not eliminating the normative is at best, misguided, and at
worst, dishonest. There is no way I can see for Quine to defend
himself from the claims that he is eliminating the normative.
An idea that Quine can eliminate the normative, yet still keep
the importance and signiﬁcance of knowledge for science, is
something that has been debated ever since he ﬁrst penned
his essay. For most anti-naturalists, it is clear that there are
grave problems once you have eliminated the normative in
epistemology. First, if knowledge can be something that is merely
relatively true, it cannot lead to an intelligible knowledge of the
fact on the part of the observer. Relativity clouds the ability
to know what it is that one is observing. Second, according
to Putnam, all that happens to our understanding of “true”
in this new sense, is that we look at it as “a mere mechanism
for switching from one level of language to another” (Putnam
322). What he means is that all we are doing is changing the
language of the debate, but not actually answering the question
asked.
The question of normativity remains a major debate to this day.
With naturalists and anti-naturalists going back and forth over
its importance, it is no wonder so many people ﬁnd the debate
to be un-resolvable. Nevertheless, it is only through constant
debate that either side can come closer to a sense of what is the
truth about epistemology.
I do have a deﬁnite opinion of this debate, and it should be
clear from my overview of the debate and the emphasis I placed
on the normative where my allegiance lies. I am a convinced
anti-naturalist. I have great reservations about Epistemology
Naturalized. Just as it is the greatest problem for Putnam, I
ﬁnd it entirely irresponsible. I believe it has irreparably harmed
philosophy by eliminating the normative in epistemology and
removing epistemology itself from the ﬁeld of philosophy. Not
only has it harmed philosophy, though, it has also harmed
science, since it has removed any notions of understandable
foundations for science to rest upon.
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Furthermore, I do not see how Quine can link his skepticism
to that of Hume. David Hume was not only skeptical of
what philosophy could tell us, as Quine points out. He was
also skeptical of what scientiﬁc knowledge was. Linking
epistemology to psychology, a ﬁeld of science, does not appear
to settle any of the epistemic problems Hume observed, despite
Quine’s protests to the contrary.
I do not entirely agree with Hilary Putnam, either. His ideas
betray a lack of belief in a metaphysical reality, which I cannot
accept, and he is much too conciliatory towards Quine. Putnam
left many lines of thought unexplored in his essay. Nevertheless,
his cautious approach is better than no opposition at all to
Quine’s idea. I have no doubt that naturalism can only bring
about more confusion than knowledge. I only hope that with
this ongoing debate, those who oppose naturalism can once
again gain greater clarity in their defense of true philosophy.
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